There was a time in Illinois when inmates could get released from state prison in only days. It was the era of “dress-in-dress-out.”

Those days are long gone, but the state penitentiary has re-instituted another form of early release. The new early release program has caused confusion in courtrooms throughout the state. To understand it, a look back at history is needed.

In 2009, the state economy was in the worst part of the Great Recession, and government needed to save money. The Department of Corrections devised a scheme to release inmates early, saving on costs and decreasing population. But, they went too far and politics caught up with them.

While the state penitentiary was supposed to keep inmates in custody for at least 60 days before reducing their sentences with early release credits, IDOC was giving inmates credit from day 1. The result was that prisoners who had sentencing credit for their time in county jails awaiting trial were eligible for release on their first day in IDOC.

The lore was that these inmates would go downstate on a bus in their county jail garb and once they reached their IDOC facility, dress into IDOC clothes, and then change into civilian attire for release. The practice was dubbed “dress-in-dress-out.”

Investigative reporters from the Associated Press exposed the practice in December 2009. Allegedly IDOC had distributed a memo about an “MGT Push,” referring to using meritorious good time credit to reduce prison population.

At the time, Governor Pat Quinn was mired in a tough re-election campaign against State Senator Bill Brady. He immediately signed an order putting a stop to the program.

But he didn’t just stop the award of credit from the first day. Rather, he stopped the award of all credit, including a 6-month good conduct credit authorized by statute, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3). And so, inmates began staying in prison for longer than ever.

Most would agree that the decision was political. Quinn won the election, but then-Director of IDOC Michael Randle was forced to resign.

On February 22, 2013, IDOC re-implemented the early release program with a few changes. While dress-in-dress-out may be over, there are some similarities to the early release program pre-2009.

First and foremost, the requirement of serving 60 days before receiving other early release credits is back. But this time, it is written into law. Before 2009, the 60-day requirement was unwritten and no one complied with it. Now this is the rule followed in every case.

The 60-day requirement created the term, “61-day wonder,” which describes an inmate who is immediately eligible for release after serving 60 days. A prisoner serving 1 year IDOC on an ordinary, non-violent Class 4 felony should become a 61-day wonder.

The 6-month good conduct credit is back, too. While the Code of Corrections calls it good conduct credit, IDOC is calling it Supplemental Sentence Credit (SSC). But the name is not the only thing that has changed. There are more restrictions.

The Department of Corrections has provided the following guidance:

For an offender to be eligible for an award of SSC, first and foremost, he or she must have served more than 60 days in IDOC custody and be serving a sentence for offenses that are not excluded from an award pursuant to Section 3-6-3(a)(3) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(3)). Additionally, some offenders, by the nature of their current commitment offenses, will only be eligible for up to 90 days of SSC pursuant to Section 3-6-3(a)(3) of the Code of Corrections.

There are additional administrative rule requirements that must be met in order for an offender to be eligible for an award of SSC. The offender:

• must not be subject to review under the Sexually Violent Person’s Act,
• must not have been found guilty of a 100 level disciplinary offense (violated while in custody) under 20 Ill. Adm. Code 504,
• must not have any pending criminal charges committed during the current incarceration,
• must not have been returned to the Department for a violation of his or her parole or mandatory supervised release during their current incarceration,
• must not have voluntarily quit or have been terminated for disciplinary reasons from a boot camp program,
• if recommended by a court, must have completed substance abuse treatment or been waived from the requirement by the Department, and
• must have completed mandatory sex offender treatment (if necessary) or been waived of the requirement by the Department (if applicable).

IDOC has gone out of its way to warn that this credit is discretionary and no one is entitled to it. But that may be for appearances, because the prison is overcrowded and underfunded.

The state prison system has room for 33,000 inmates. But the population is about 49,000. IDOC facilities are now turning gymnasiums into living space for minimum security inmates. Tamms maximum security prison was closed and the state plans to close Dwight women’s correctional center, too.

Critics say that this program will do nothing to reduce over-population because the requirements are too stringent.

Prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges should follow this story closely.

Defendants in felony cases are subject to special rules in sentencing. Compared to misdemeanor sentencing, felonies are complicated. The court is governed by obscure rules that can sometimes produce unexpected results. And the last thing a defense attorney wants in court is to advise a client on a sentence and have something unexpected come up.

When the judge determines that a penitentiary sentence is appropriate, the most important issue is whether the state’s Truth-in-Sentencing law applies.

The term truth-in-sentencing refers to a statute that requires the Department of Corrections to execute a sentence in a manner that is consistent with the term of years handed down by the judge.

Basically, the truth-in-sentencing law was enacted to stop early release.

Most felony prison sentences are served at 50% of the time indicated by the court on the mittimus (eg, sentencing order – in Cook County, judges call this the mitt). When the truth-in-sentencing law was enacted in 1998, defendants who were sentenced for first degree murder were serving 50% or less of their sentences.

The statute that increased the amount of time that has to be served comes from the Code of Corrections at 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3. It provides the following rules for prison inmates:

A defendant who is convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1) or terrorism (720 ILCS 5/29D-14.1) does not get early release and must serve 100% of his sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i).

A defendant serving a sentence for any of the following crimes must also serve 85% of his sentence:

• Attempt terrorism. 720 ILCS 5/8-4 and 29D-14.1.
• Attempt first degree murder 720 ILCS 5/8-4 and 9-1.
• Solicitation of murder. 720 ILCS 5/8-1.
• Solicitation of murder for hire. 720 ILCS 5/8-1.2.
• Intentional homicide of an unborn child. 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2.
• Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40.
• Aggravated criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.30.
• Criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/11-1.20.
• Aggravated kidnapping. 720 ILCS 5/10-2.
• Aggravated battery with a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), or (e)(4).
• Heinous battery. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(2).
• Being an armed habitual criminal. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7.
• Aggravated battery to a senior citizen. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(4).
• Aggravated battery to a child. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1).

See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii).

Prisoners who are incarcerated on a sentence for any of these crimes must serve 85%, as well:

• Home invasion.720 ILCS 5/19-6.
• Armed robbery. 720 ILCS 5/18-2.
• Aggravated vehicular hijacking. 720 ILCS 5/18-4.
• Aggravated discharge of a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2.
• Armed violence with a category I weapon or category II weapon causing great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/33A-2.

See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(iii).

Under a newer provision of this truth-in-sentencing law, some offenses are now served at 75% of time:

• Gunrunning. 720 ILCS 5/24-3A.
• Narcotics racketeering. 725 ILCS 175/4.
• Controlled substance trafficking. 720 ILCS 570/401.1.
• Methamphetamine trafficking. 720 ILCS 646/56.
• Drug-induced homicide. 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3.
• Aggravated methamphetamine-related child endangerment. 720 ILCS 646/50(b).
• Money laundering. 720 ILCS 5/29B-1(c)(4) or (c)(5).
• Class X felony conviction for delivery of a controlled substance (within 1,000 feet). 720 ILCS 570/401.
• Possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver. 720 ILCS 570/401.
• Calculated criminal drug conspiracy. 720 ILCS 570/405(b).
• Criminal drug conspiracy. 720 ILCS 570/405.1.
• Street gang criminal drug conspiracy. 720 ILCS 570/405.2.
• Participation in methamphetamine manufacturing. 720 ILCS 646/15.
• Aggravated participation in methamphetamine manufacturing. 720 ILCS 646/15(b).
• Delivery of methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 646/55.
• Possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 646/55.
• Aggravated delivery of methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 646/55(b).
• Aggravated possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 646/55(b).
• Methamphetamine conspiracy with a weight of 100 grams or more. 720 ILCS 646/65.

See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(v).

A second offense of luring a minor (720 ILCS 5/10-5.1) is served at 85%. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(vi).

A sentence for aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3) is served at 85%. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(vii).

A defendant sentenced to imprisonment for aggravated driving under the influence, 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F), which involves death, or 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C), which involves great bodily harm, must serve a sentence of 85% time. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) and (2.3) and (2.6).

A sentence of natural life shall be just that, natural life at 100% of time. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2.2). Note that the death penalty was abolished, .

Finally, a the legislature added two weapons offenses to the list of crimes served at 85%:

• Aggravated battery with a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a silencer.
• Aggravated discharge of a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a silencer. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2-5.

All other sentences are served at 50% of time. Sometimes inmates call this day-for-day, early release, or good-time credit. The statute itself calls the reduction ‘good conduct credit.’ It can be revoked by the Department of Corrections for misbehavior.

This is the state of the law at the time this article was written in 2013. The Illinois Criminal Code underwent some major revisions in 2012, so much so that the title was changed to the Criminal Code of 2012. It replaced the Criminal Code of 1961, its predecessor for over 50 years.

But the list of crimes that are served at 85% is sure to increase. Each year, lawmakers in Springfield will seek to add additional offenses to the list that are served at 85%.

A person who is charged with a felony but has no criminal background will benefit from a new state law in 2013 that allows for dismissal. The Offender Initiative Program is a new statute modeled after the deferred prosecution program developed by Cook County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez. The statute will apply in all counties starting in 2013.

This new deferred prosecution program appears in the criminal code at 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3. The statute allows the court to place first-time felony offenders on a special probation that is not a conviction. As long as no conviction is entered, the offender should be eligible to have the record expunged.

However, not every charge will qualify for the program. The general rules are that it must be the defendant’s first felony offense. It must be probationable. Thus, no Class X felony would be eligible. The felony cannot be a crime of violence, and the offender cannot have a prior offense that was a crime of violence.

The number of felonies eligible for deferred prosecution may increase, but in 2013, only the following charges are eligible:

• Theft, 720 ILCS 5/16-1.
• Retail theft, 720 ILCS 5/16-25.
• Forgery, 720 ILCS 5/17-3.
• Possession of a stolen motor vehicle, 625 ILCS 5/4-103.
• Burglary, 720 ILCS 5/19-1.
• Possession of burglary tools, 720 ILCS 5/19-2.
• Possession of cannabis, 720 ILCS 550/4.
• Possession of a controlled substance, 720 ILCS 570/402.
• Possession of methamphetamine, 720 ILCS 646/60.

See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3(a-1).

A defendant will be excluded for any pending or prior crime of violence, even if it happened when he was a juvenile.

For purposes of this Program, a “violent offense” is any offense where bodily harm was inflicted or where force was used against any person or threatened against any person, any offense involving sexual conduct, sexual penetration, or sexual exploitation, any offense of domestic violence, domestic battery, violation of an order of protection, stalking, hate crime, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and any offense involving the possession of a firearm or dangerous weapon.

730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3(a-2).

The defendant and State must agree to the deferred prosecution and waive preliminary hearing. The requirement of approval from the State will be problematic where county State’s Attorneys refuse to allow deferred prosecutions as a matter of policy. The court cannot overrule the State, and so a county prosecutor who wants to appear tough on crime can refuse to allow it and it will never happen. Or the county probation department may balk at having to spend money on a new program, which may influence the State to refuse.

Assuming the State agrees, the prosecution will be suspended for a minimum period of 12 months. During this time, the judge will hold the defendant to the following requirements:

• Not violate the law.
• Not possess a firearm or dangerous weapon.
• Make restitution to the victim.
• Obtain employment or perform 30 hours of community service.
• Work towards obtaining a GED or obtain vocational training.

See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3(c).

The court also will have discretion to hold the defendant to the following requirements:

• Counseling or psychiatric treatment.
• No illegal drugs.
• Random testing.
• Pay fines, fees and court costs.
• And if a minor, reside with parents or in a foster home, attend school or a youth program, and contribute to the family’s finances.

See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3(d).

If the defendant fails to comply, then the prosecution will proceed with arraignment, trial, and if found guilty, sentencing.

Each offender is eligible for the program only once.

This new law was sponsored by Sen. Kwame Raoul (D-Chicago) and Rep. Kimberly du Buclet (D-Chicago).

A person who is found guilty of a misdemeanor can have his record expunged in most circumstances. Most misdemeanors allow the court to impose a term of supervision if the defendant has no criminal history. Supervision is not a conviction, and it can be expunged.

A conviction, however, cannot be expunged. It can only be sealed. Misdemeanor convictions can be sealed, but not felonies.

But there are misdemeanor convictions that the legislature in Springfield has excluded from sealing all together. Our lawmakers excluded these charges from eligibility on policy grounds. In their opinion, for the protection of the public, a defendant should not be able to seal a conviction for certain charges.

The following misdemeanor convictions cannot be sealed:

• Battery, 720 ILCS 5/12-3
• Assault, 720 ILCS 5/12-1
• Aggravated assault, 720 ILCS 5/12-2
• Domestic battery, 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2
• Reckless conduct, 720 ILCS 5/12-5
• Criminal sexual abuse, 720 ILCS 5/11-1.50
• Violation of an order of protection, 720 ILCS 5/12-3.4

These charges are defined as crimes of violence under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/2(c)).

A conviction for any of these crimes cannot be sealed.

However, a term of supervision for any of the above is eligible for expungement.

As anyone with a criminal record can tell you, one conviction can have a devastating impact on your future. When you apply for a job with a criminal record, you usually don’t expect to make it past the background check.

But that all may change soon under an important policy change with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC is a government agency that oversees the labor market and regulates hiring practices. The purpose of the EEOC is to prevent discrimination, and under the new policy initiative, that includes discrimination against people who have criminal records.

The EEOC announced a plan in which employers are directed to avoid using a background check as the sole reason for rejecting a job applicant. Announcing this new policy on April 25, 2012, the EEOC warned against disqualifying job applicants with criminal backgrounds:

“I would suggest to (businesses) that they think long and hard about why they think they need to do a criminal background check,” said John Hendrickson, the regional attorney for the EEOC’s Chicago district…

To avoid missteps, the EEOC suggests that companies consider three things: how long ago the crime was committed, the nature of the crime and how the crime might relate to the job. The agency also said companies should also give ex-offenders a chance during job interviews to explain conviction circumstances as well as rehabilitation efforts.

A person who applies for a job and is rejected on the sole basis of criminal record may have standing to file a lawsuit against the employer.

Even before the guidance was issued, companies were put on notice that they could be vulnerable to paying damages to people for using their criminal history background against them. In January, Pepsi was ordered in a court case to pay $3.13 million to black applicants who’d been denied work because of past arrests or minor convictions. As a result, Pepsi revamped its hiring procedures.

For more information about this new policy from the EEOC, read this statement of best practices regarding background checks.

Chicago radio station WBBM recently reported that statistics show that during traffic stops, minorities are charged with traffic offenses disproportionately.

Depending on their sources, statistics can be misleading. But these numbers come from a source that even prosecutors and judges would acknowledge as an authority: the Illinois Department of Transportation.

A WBBM Newsradio analysis of Illinois Department of Transportation numbers indicates that, in 2011, 61 percent of minorities who were stopped by police got traffic tickets, while only 52 percent of whites did. There was a similar disparity in 2010.

Caucasians also fared better in the written warning department last year. In 2011, whites who were stopped received written warnings 32 percent of the time, compared to 21 percent of the time for African-Americans or Latinos…

The state started keeping track of the racial breakdown of drivers in 2004, to determine what extent racial profiling might be used by police in making traffic stops.

In 2004, nearly 2.5 million motorists were stopped by police in Illinois. Of those, more than 60 percent of whites stopped received tickets while 68 percent of minorities who were pulled over were ticketed. Also in 2004, nearly 25 percent of whites stopped received written warnings while 16.5 percent of minorities did.

Illinois residents should be aware that state law requires troopers to record every traffic stop with audio and video. See 20 ILCS 2610/30. The State Police Act requires all State Police squads to be equipped with recording equipment.

The law protects troopers from false accusations and also people who are stopped. A recording can show an absence of probable cause for the stop, or an illegal search. This would result in the dismissal of charges.

The offense of theft under Illinois law is misunderstood. Many people think that because it is not a violent offense, and in some cases, it has no discernible victim, it is not a serious offense. This thinking is wrong. Theft can result in a jail sentence.

A person who is arrested for theft, assuming he has no prior offenses, will usually be charged with a Class A misdemeanor. Other crimes which are categorized as Class A misdemeanors include domestic battery, battery, possession of cannabis, and driving under the influence. All these crimes can be punished by up to one year in jail. The defendant can be fined $2500.

The theft statute is found in the criminal code at 720 ILCS 5/16-1. The statute provides that two factors determine how serious the crime is:

1. Whether the property was taken from another’s person.
2. The value of the property.

Where the property was taken from the person of another, or the property was valuable, the penalties for theft increase.

Although it prohibits taking property, the theft statute applies in all cases, including cases where the defendant is accused of taking money. In these instances, the property alleged to have been taken is US currency.

Theft is a Class A misdemeanor whenever the property stolen is not from another’s person and does not exceed $500 in value. However, where the offense occurs in a school or place of worship (church), this offense is a Class 4 felony.

And so, a first offense of theft is a misdemeanor. However, if the accused has previously been found guilty of any type of theft, including robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools, home invasion, forgery, or any vehicle code offenses relating to the possession of a stolen motor vehicle, or unlawful use of a credit or debit card, then a first offense of theft is enhanced to a Class 4 felony. This felony has a sentencing range of 1 to 3 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The defendant can also receive probation.

Theft which is from another’s person but is $500 or less is a Class 3 felony. A Class 3 felony can result in a prison sentence of 2 to 5 years.

The next step above $500 is $10,000 in value. Theft of property valued at $10,000 or less which is not taken from another’s person is a Class 3 felony.

Theft of property which is $100,000 value or less is a Class 2 felony. The potential punishment for this crime is 3 to 7 years in the state penitentiary.

Theft of property which is $500,000 in value or less is a Class 1 felony (4-15 years prison).

Theft of $1,000,000 or less is a Class 1 felony but the trial court judge is prohibited from giving the offender probation. He or she must sentence the defendant to prison. This type of crime is called non-probationable.

A person charged with theft for a property that exceeds $1 million in value faces a Class X felony with a mandatory minimum 6 to 30 years prison.

The statute defines theft as the following:

A person commits theft when he or she knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner. A person is guilty of theft if he or she obtains such control by deception or threat. A person is also guilty of theft if he obtains control over stolen property knowing the property is stolen or under such circumstances as a reasonable person would believe that the property was stolen. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4).

The value of the stolen property must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that if the State fails to prove the value of the property, the defendant may be found guilty of a lesser offense, or acquitted.

It is not a defense to theft that the defendant has some ownership interest in the property, as long as the owner has an interest in some part of the property while the defendant does not.

While the penalties for theft are severe, these cases can be defended. In each case, the defendant is presumed innocent, as the prosecutor must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reasonable doubt may exist as to whether or not the control was really unauthorized. For example, if the owner consented, and the defendant is not guilty. But more precisely, if there is reasonable doubt as to whether the owner consented, then the presumption of innocence requires the fact finder to find the defendant not guilty.

Where the defendant is charged with theft by deception, the question remains whether the defendant really was deceptive.

Likewise, theft by threat is vague in the respect that some threats are legal while others are not. For instance, it is legal to threaten to file a lawsuit against someone.

Theft cases may lend themselves to jury trials because the question is the credibility of the owner. And there may be a question of whether the owner would ever come to court. The law does not allow the court to presume that the control is unauthorized. The only presumption that is permitted under the law is the presumption of the defendant’s innocence.

Illinois courts have a new law that allows an individual to seek a restraining order against another. In 2010, state lawmakers in Springfield passed a bill creating a stalking no contact order.

The restraining order that is available under this statute differs from an order of protection and a sexual assault civil no contact order.

An order of protection is intended to be used for a restraining order against a person with whom the petition has a relationship, such as a romantic relationship or familial relationship. A sexual assault no contact order is intended to be used by a person who is the victim of a sex crime against the perpetrator.

State legislators changed the law because these two forms of restraining orders did nothing to protect people who are the victims of stalking. For instance, a person who is the victim of stalking may not qualify as a family or household member per the order of protection statute. And, they may not qualify for a sexual assault no contact order because no crime was committed against them.

The procedure for obtaining a stalking no contact order is found under 740 ILCS 21/1. Just as with an order of protection, the person seeking a restraining order has to file a petition in court. This person is called the petitioner, and the individual against whom they are seeking a restraining order is called the respondent. The person seeking the stalking no contact order will be heard by judge will determine whether to grant a remedy. There is no cost for filing.

If the judge determines that there is enough evidence to issue the emergency order, a deputy from the sheriff’s department will serve the respondent with the order. The emergency order will last from 14 to 21 days. Any contact between respondent and the petitioner during this time could constitute a crime.

Anyone who is the victim of stalking is entitled to seek an order from court.

The term “stalking” is described as follows:

“Stalking” means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person or suffer emotional distress.

740 ILCS 21/10.

Additionally, a “reasonable person” is defined as a person in the petitioner’s circumstances with the petitioner’s knowledge of the respondent and the respondent’s prior acts. See id.

Once service of the emergency order has been effectuated, the respondent is entitled to a hearing. The respondent has an opportunity to defend his or her self in court by presenting evidence including witness testimony and exhibits.

The petitioner can seek several remedies from the judge:

• Prohibiting the respondent from committing or threatening stalking.
• Order the respondent to have no contact with the victim.
• Prohibit the respondent from coming near the victim’s home, school, place of employment or other places frequented by the victim.
• Prohibit the respondent from possessing any firearms or firearm ammunition, and also require the respondent to surrender a Firearm Owner Identification Card (FOID).
• Issue an injunction preventing the respondent from engaging in certain conduct.

After the hearing, if the judge determines that it is appropriate to enter an order for protection of the petitioner, the court will enter a plenary order. A plenary order prohibiting stalking and contact by the respondent can last for up to two years.

If the respondent makes contact with the petitioner in violation of this order, including through a third-party, the respondent can be prosecuted.

The law is problematic in the respect that it costs nothing to file petition for a stalking no contact order. While state lawmakers had the best of intentions in creating this law, they should have anticipated that it would be used much like a petition for an order of connection.

Orders of protection have been abused and misused by people seeking to get the upper hand in a divorce or child custody dispute for years. In fact, while the intent of the legislature in creating an order of protection was to prevent abuse and harassment, it may have actually created a means of abuse and harassment.

The second problem with the stalking no contact order is that this is a free country, and people are free to express their opinions even if others find them to be offensive. An individual has a right to free speech, and this includes the right to engage another in discourse. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that government shall make no laws infringing upon freedom of speech or assembly.

The Illinois legislature knew this when drafting the bill for the stalking no contact order. And so, they included the following language to protect free speech:

Stalking does not include an exercise of the right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful or picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute, including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.

740 ILCS 21/10.

The problem with the foregoing exemption from the stalking no contact order is that the court may be reluctant to deny petitioners protection under the law for fear that they may later become the victims of crime.

Anyone who is served with a petition and or an emergency order prohibiting stalking should seek the advice of counsel.

All persons who have ever been arrested in Cook County should be aware of the free expungement seminar scheduled for June 2, 2012.

Under Illinois law, any person who is arrested and charged with a crime has a record with the Illinois State Police that can be disseminated nationwide. The record of the arrest remains even if the person is found not guilty, or receives court supervision.

The only way to remove the record is to file a petition to expunge or seal it. The process was changed in 2010 to make it easier for people with records to get them expunged.

Cook County is providing a clinic on expungement that costs nothing to attend.

It is sponsored by State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez, Public Defender Abishi Cunningham Jr, and Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, Dr. Byron Brazier of the Apostolic Church of God in Chicago, and many others.

The event will take place all day on June 2, 2012 at the Apostolic Church of God at 6320 S. Dorchester Ave in Chicago.

Illinois state law concerning retail theft has seen some significant changes in the year 2012. State lawmakers in Springfield have overhauled the retail theft statute. First, the offense is no longer found under 720 ILCS 5/16A-1. That section was repealed, and replaced by Section 16-25. All charges for retail theft written in 2012 fall under 720 ILCS 5/16-25. Second, the penalties have changed in some very important ways.

The elements of the crime of retail theft remain relatively the same. The law provides that a person is guilty of retail theft when he or she knowingly takes possession of, carries away, transfers or causes to be carried away, any merchandise displayed or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such merchandise or depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying full retail value.

As before, it is also still a crime to alter, transfer, or remove any label or price tag, or for an employee of the retail store to under-ring merchandise (that is, to charge less than the full retail price for a friend or family member). And as before, it is a crime to use or to possess any theft detection shielding device which would enable the person to pass through security without being detected with stolen merchandise.

The retail theft statute still provides that the court can draw an inference of guilt against the defendant where he conceals upon his person or in his belongings any unpurchased merchandise. Also, the court can infer guilt against a person who removes the merchandise beyond the last point-of-purchase (cash register).

The good news is that, despite the inference of guilt, a retail theft case can still be won in court. The fact is that people commit retail theft all the time unintentionally. It is a daily occurrence for shoppers to go to their cars in the parking lot and find merchandise on the bottom of a shopping cart that they failed to pay for through neglect. Fortunately for these people, the law presumes that they are innocent. They can only be proven guilty with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a difference between making a mistake and not paying for merchandise and intentionally stealing something.

Also, for people who are arrested for retail theft and make a statement admitting that they possessed the item, an admission to possessing an item that was not paid for is different from an admission of guilt. Basically, a person who is honest can take responsibility for not paying for something and have that misconstrued as though it was a confession to a crime. For example, a person who was stopped with unpurchased merchandise may say, “That’s my fault. I’m sorry.” But that does not mean that the person intended to commit a crime. Because that statement is exactly what an innocent person would say when they realize that they made a mistake and failed to pay for something.

The state legislature changed the penalties for retail theft in 2012. Whereas before, if the value of the stolen merchandise was greater than $150, the offender could be charged with a felony. Now, as long as the value of the merchandise is $300 or less, the offense is a misdemeanor. This is a very important distinction. If a person is found guilty of a felony, he will have a permanent conviction that cannot be expunged or sealed. Ever. Compare that to a misdemeanor, which can be expunged.

There is one exception to this new rule, where there stolen goods are motor fuel. Apparently, lobbyists in Springfield convinced the legislature that people who steal from a gasoline station should be punished more severely. If the value of gas taken from a gas station is greater than $150, the offender can be charged with a felony.

The misdemeanor offense of retail theft is a Class A misdemeanor, with a potential penalty of up to one year in jail and a maximum fine of $2500. The defendant would be eligible for supervision, which is not a conviction and can be expunged. Any jail sentence for retail theft would be served at 50 percent of time.

On the other hand, if the value of the stolen goods was in excess of $300, the offense is a Class 3 felony. In this instance, the potential penalty can include 2 to 5 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. A conviction can never be expunged, and can never be sealed. A defendant can have that record removed only if the governor approves a pardon. Before Easter Sunday this year, Governor Quinn approved the pardons of approximately 50 people in Illinois. The governor typically approves pardons before a long weekend for a holiday, to avoid scrutiny from the press. It is unclear how many people applied for a governor’s pardon. Many of the pardons that were approved were backlogged under the former governor who is now in federal prison, Governor Blagojevich.

Any person who is charged with retail theft and has a prior offense of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools, home invasion, unlawful use of a credit card, or forgery, can be charged with a Class 4 felony. And so, even a first offense of retail theft can be a felony if the person has a prior offense that triggers the enhanced penalty. A Class 4 felony has a sentencing range of 1 to 3 years in prison, but the defendant can receive probation.

This is an overview of the retail theft law in Illinois in 2012.